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Purpose: We explore the level and determinants of compliance with Accounting and Auditing 
Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) financial and governance standards by 
Islamic banks (IBs). 
Methodology: Our sample consists of 43 IBs across 8 countries. We use ordinary least squares 
regression analyses to examine the impact of Bank-specific characteristics and corporate 
governance mechanisms concerned with Board of Directors (BOD) and Sharia Supervisory 
Board (SSB) on levels of compliance with AAOIFI standards. 
Findings: We find that the average compliance level based on AAOIFI standards concerning 
the Sharia Supervisory Board Report (SSBR) is 68%; corporate social responsibility report 
(CSRR) is 27% and presentation of financial statements (FS) is 73%. The aggregate disclosure 
based on the 3 indices is 56%. The analysis also shows that size, existing Sharia auditing 
department, age, and corporate governance of SSB are the main determinants of compliance 
levels. 
Originality: he determinants of compliance with AAOIFI standards for IBs around the world 
not been explored before and, therefore, this paper is the first of its kind to this issue. 
 
1. Introduction 
We examine the determinants of compliance with Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) standards by Islamic Banks (IBs).    
The literature on compliance with AAOIFI explores the compliance level (e.g., Ullah, 2013; 
Vinnicombe, 2010; Ahmed and Khatun, 2013). However, the determinants of the compliance, 
considering both firm characteristics and board and Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) characteristics, 
have not yet been empirically investigated. Our paper fills the research gap. Furthermore, majority 
of prior research focuses on a single country (e.g., Hafij, 2013; Ahmed and Khatun, 2013), or is 
restricted to one category of AAOIFI standards such as the presentation of financial statements 
(Hafij, 2013) or Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) (Hassan and Harahap, 2010).  
We contribute to existing literature in a number of ways. First, we consider majority of IBs that 
adopt AAOIFI.  Secondly we consider three AAOIFI standards related to Sharia, social and 
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financial disclosures. Thirdly, we are the first large scale study that explores IBs’ compliance with 
AAOIFI standards after 2010 (the updated version for AAOIFI which includes new financial and 
governance standards). Finally, we are the first to examine the impact of both country (i.e. culture) 
and bank characteristics on compliance with AAOIFI standards.   
Our results indicate that the compliance level with AAOIFI Governance Standard No.1 is 68%; 
the compliance level with AAOIFI Governance Standard No.7 is 27% and compliance level with 
AAOIFI accounting Standard No.1 is 73%. The empirical analysis shows that size; age; SAD 
(Sharia Auditing Department); UA (uncertainty avoidance) and corporate governance of SSB 
(Sharia Supervisory Board) is significantly associated with levels of disclosure.  
Our paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses issues related to compliance with AAOIFI 
standards. Section 3 reviews the literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the 
methodology. Section 5 discusses the descriptive analysis. Section 6 reports the findings. In section 
7, we discuss our findings. Section 8 concludes.  
2. Compliance with AAOIFI 
   AAOIFI formulates and issues accounting, auditing, governance, ethics and Sharia standards for 
IFIs. AAOIFI as an independent international organisation, is supported by institutional members 
(200 members from 40 countries) including central banks, IFIs, and other participants from the 
international Islamic banking and finance industry worldwide (AAOIFI, 2015). Currently, AAOIFI 
has published 88 standards including 26 accounting standards, 5 auditing standards, 7 governance 
standards, 2 ethics standards, and 48 Sharia standards (AAOIFI, 2015). For the purpose of this 
study, compliance can be defined as “the degree to which IBs comply with the multitude of issues in the 
accounting and governance standards issued by the AAOIFI”. The following section explores the three 
AAOIFI standards of interest.   
2.1 AAOIFI and SSB  
   According to AAOIFI, a Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) is defined as “an independent body of 
specialised jurists in fiqh al mu’amalat (Islamic commercial jurisprudence)” (AAOIFI, 2010). The purpose is 
to ensure IFIs are in compliance with Sharia principles. AAOIFI published Governance Standard 
No.1, which specifies the composition of the board, and the basic elements of its annual report.  
2.2 AAOIFI and CSR  
   Corporate social responsibility (CSR) for IFIs refers to “all activities carried out by an IFI to fulfil its 
religious, economic, legal, ethical and discretionary responsibilities as financial intermediaries for individuals and 
institutions” (AAOIFI, 2010). AAOIFI issued Governance Standard No.7 in 2010 to organise the 
activities related to CSR. The primary objective for this standard is to ensure that CSR activities 
and compliance of IFIs are communicated in a truthful, transparent and comprehensible manner 
to relevant stakeholders (AAOIFI, 2010). The accountability for disclosure under this standard is 
divided between mandatory disclosure (such as earnings and expenditure prohibited by Sharia and 
Zakat) and recommended disclosure (such as Qard Hasan, charitable activities and Waqf 
management) (AAOIFI, 2010).  
2.3 AAOIFI and the presentation and disclosure in the financial statements 
   In 1993, AAOIFI issued Accounting Standard No.1 related to general presentation and 
disclosure in the financial statements of IBs. “The objectives of financial reports is to provide information 
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about the IFI’s compliance with Islamic Sharia; information about IFI’s economic resources and related obligations; 
information to assist in the determination of Zakat; IFI’s discharge of its fiduciary and social accountabilities” 
(AAOIFI, 2010). Based on this standard, the annual report contains 7 basic statements in addition 
to basic information about the bank, significant accounting policies and other information.  
3. Relevant literature and hypotheses development 
We use both agency and signalling theories to identify the potential drivers of compliance with 
AAOIFI standards.  
3.1 Firm-specific characteristics 
3.1.1 Auditor  
   Auditors play an important role in the credibility of firms’ financial information (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) stated that to maintain their reputation and avoid 
reputation costs, high-profile auditing companies are more likely to demand high levels of 
disclosure. The signalling theory suggests that the choice of an external auditor can serve as a signal 
of firm value. Generally, companies signal the quality of their financial reports by choosing large 
audit firms (Datar et al., 1991). This expectation is consistent with agency theory which holds that 
larger audit firms have a stronger incentive to impose more extensive disclosure standards because 
they have more to lose from damage to their reputations. The findings of Xiao et al. (2004) 
supported this proposition with a positive relationship between firms employing one of the Big 4 
international auditing firms and their scopes of corporate disclosure. Guerreiro et al., (2008); 
Hodgdon et al. (2009) examined corporate disclosure and found it to be positively related to 
auditor size. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H1. The degree of disclosure is predicted to be higher in IBs audited by the Big 4 
auditors than in IBs that are audited by non-Big 4 auditors  
3.1.2 Age of bank  
   Older, well-established companies are likely to disclose much more information in their annual 
reports than younger companies because they are less likely to suffer any competitive disadvantage. 
In addition, the cost and the ease of gathering, processing, and disseminating the required 
information may be a contributory factor (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Many studies have shown that 
disclosure level is positively associated with company age (Cormier et al., 2005; Hossain and 
Hammami, 2009) while others (Alsaeed, 2005) conclude that the age of the corporation has 
insignificant association with the level of disclosure. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H2: Older IBs are expected to disclose more information than younger IBs  
3.1.3 Firm size 
   According to agency theory, larger firms need to disclose more information to different user 
groups which leads to a decline in agency costs and reduces information asymmetries (Inchausti, 
1997). In prior disclosure studies, the association between firm size and disclosure reporting is 
mixed. For example, while some studies found a positive association (Hassan et al., 2006; 
Elshandidy et al., 2013), others found an insignificant association (Rajab and Schachler, 2009). 
Firm size is a significant determinant of disclosure and accounting policy choice” and a 
“discriminator for accounting quality (Rahman et al., 2002). Moreover, large firms face higher 
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demand for information from customers, analysts and the general public (Cooke, 1989). This 
results in increased pressure to disclose information. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H3. Large IBs are more likely to disclose more information than small IBs 
3.1.4 Profitability  
    Inchausti (1997) suggested that profitability is capable of influencing the extent to which 
companies disclose information items. Consistent with the signalling theory, management when 
in possession of “good news” due to better performance are more likely to disclose more detailed 
information to the stock market than that provided by companies in possession of “bad news” to 
avoid undervaluation of their shares. Ahmed and Courtis (1999) showed that the results of prior 
studies provide mixed evidence on the association between firm’s profitability and the level of 
corporate disclosure. Elshandidy et al. (2013) reported a positive association between both 
variables. Nonetheless, agency theory expects that managers of firms with high profitability would 
tend to provide more corporate information to justify their present performance to the 
shareholders.  
Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H4. Disclosure are expected to be higher for highly profitable IBs than low profit  
3.1.5 Internal Sharia auditing department (ISAD) 
    Mercer (2004) argued that the Sharia auditing department “serve as the first line of defence against 
disclosure errors, ferreting out unintentional errors caused by weaknesses in a company’s internal controls and 
intentional errors due to fraud”. The internal audit function plays a unique and critical role in corporate 
governance by helping to ensure the reliability of financial reporting (Gramling et al., 2004; 
Carcello et al., 2005). The literature provides evidence that internal auditing has positive impact on 
financial reporting oversight and level of disclosure. Schneider and Wilner (1990) found that the 
presence of internal auditors deters fraudulent financial reporting. Other studies establish links 
between internal auditing and firm performance (e.g., Gordon and Smith, 1992). Archambeault et 
al. (2008) highlighted the need for an internal audit to improve governance transparency. Wilson 
and Walsh (1996) provided a basis for predicting that an internal auditing department will increase 
investors’ confidence in financial reporting reliability and perceived oversight effectiveness. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H5: The level of corporate disclosure is positively associated with ISAD inside IBs 
3.2 Corporate Governance (CG) of BOD characteristics 
   To develop our research hypotheses, we review prior research which suggests an association 
between corporate disclosure and certain corporate governance mechanisms (La Porta et al., 2002; 
Eng and Mak, 2003).  
3.2.1 Number of block holders 
   A block holder is a shareholder with an exceptionally large amount of shares. Early research 
indicated a negative relation between block holder ownership and disclosure (Schadewitz and 
Blevins, 1998; Hossain et al., 1994), while Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found a positive association. 
Marston and Polei (2004) argued that investors who own a large proportion of equity shares in a 
company can obtain information about the company from internal sources. Therefore, more 
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closely held companies are more likely to disclose less information because their large investors 
can access internal sources of information. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H6. IBs with high percentages of block holder ownership have low levels of disclosures 
3.2.2 Institutional ownership 
   Agency theory predicts that ownership structure affects the level of corporate disclosure (Eng 
and Mak, 2003). The relationship between institutional ownership and disclosure has been 
examined in prior studies; however, the empirical evidence is mixed. Schadewitz and Blevins (1998) 
found a negative association, while Mangena and Pike (2005) found a positive association between 
the two variables. IBs with a concentrated ownership structure do not have to disseminate more 
corporate information, because the main shareholders can easily obtain it, as they usually have 
access to that information. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H7. There is a negative relationship between disclosure and institutional ownership 
3.2.3 Foreign ownership 
   Based on agency theory, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggested that as the number of shareholders 
increases and ownership becomes more dispersed, the demands for additional information 
increase. Recent studies have found an association between disclosure and foreign ownership. For 
instance, according to Xiao et al. (2004), higher foreign ownership not only encourages 
information disclosure, but also motivates firms to create English web pages to facilitate 
dissemination of financial information. The extent of foreign investor ownership is an important 
determinant of the demand for financial information (Soderstrom and Sun, 2007). Therefore, we 
hypothesize that: 
H8. There is a positive relationship between disclosure for IBs and foreign ownership. 
3.2.4 Duality in position 
   Role duality in position exists when the CEO (chief executive officer) is also the chairman of the 
board. Agency theory predicts that role duality creates individual power for the CEO that would 
affect the effective control exercised by the board. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that independent 
directors can play a significant role in monitoring the performance of managers. The results of 
prior research provide mixed evidence on the association between duality in position and corporate 
disclosure. Some studies find a negative association between the two variables (Laksmana, 2008; 
Gul and Leung, 2004). Other studies did not find any significant association (Cheng and Courtenay, 
2006). Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H9. IBs with duality in position have a lower level of corporate disclosures. 
3.2.5 Board independence 
    Fama (1980) argued that the board of directors, which is elected by the shareholders, is the 
central internal control mechanism for monitoring managers. Chau and Leung (2006) suggested 
that independent directors will increase the quality of monitoring over management, because “they 
are not affiliated with the company as officers or employees, and thus are independent representatives of the 
shareholders’ interests” (Pincus et al., 1989, p.246). The presence of independent directors on boards 
may improve the quality of financial statements (Peasnell et al., 2005). Prior research supported 
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the positive association between disclosure and board independence (i.e. Chen and Jaggi, 2000). 
Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H10. IBs with higher proportions of independent non-executive directors on the board 
have higher levels of corporate disclosures. 
3.3 Corporate Governance of SSB Characteristics 
In the context of Islam, the model of corporate governance for business organisations is derived 
from the Sharia rulings. For example, they have to design the system according to Sharia principles 
and provide stakeholders’ rights protection (Hassan, 2008). According to Grais and Pellegrini 
(2006), the unique attributes of IBs must be clarified in order to improve corporate governance 
mechanisms. Therefore, SSB is the most important distinction between Islamic banks and 
conventional banks (Farook et al., 2011; Grais and Pellegrini, 2006). Previous studies have found 
that the existence of the SSB and its characteristics have increased the disclosure levels of IBs 
(Farook et al., 2011).  
3.3.1 SSB size 
    Empirical evidence suggested that board size can affect the level of disclosure (Akhatruddin et al., 
2009). The common number of SSB members in IBs is between three and five members based on 
AAOIFI Governance Standard No.7. According to Chen and Jaggi (2000), a larger board size may 
decrease the possibility of information asymmetry. Agency theory predicts that larger boards 
incorporate a variety of expertise which results in more effectiveness in the monitoring role of the 
boards (Singh et al., 2004). Moreover, a higher number of board members may also reduce the 
uncertainty and the lack of information (Birnbaum, 1984). The board’s size is likely to affect its ability 
to control and review all transactions to ensure their operations. With more members, the collective 
knowledge and experience of SSB will increase, and lead to greater disclosure.  Therefore, we 
hypothesize that: 
H11: There is a positive relationship between size of SSB and disclosure levels  
 
 
3.3.2 SSB Cross-memberships 
    Cross-memberships of SSB members may also influence the corporate disclosure of IBs 
(Farook et al., 2011). There is evidence that cross-directorships increase information transparency 
through comparing the knowledge that is gained from other companies (Dahya et al., 1996); and 
because decisions taken at one board may become part of the information for decisions at other 
boards (Haat et al., 2008; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). The cross-membership of SSB members is 
preferable because of their ensuing knowledge and credibility (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). 
Furthermore, SSB members with cross-memberships will be able to adopt their tacit and explicit 
knowledge into their application of Sharia rulings in Islamic banking. Therefore, we hypothesize 
that: 
H12: There is a positive relationship between SSB cross-membership and disclosure  
3.3.3 SSB Reputation  
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   An SSB is composed of Sharia scholars who have wide knowledge of Islamic commercial law, 
but less experience of secular educational institutions. Hussain and Mallin (2003) showed that the 
determinants affecting the directors’ appointments in Bahraini banks are pertinent skills, business 
practice and reputation. Sharia scholars have an excellent reputation in their community because 
of their universal knowledge of Islam and their credibility and significant role in that community. 
For this reason, reputation can be used as a measure for business knowledge, and therefore, 
scholars who have a good reputation will be able to comprehend better the modern applications 
of the banking industry pertaining to disclosure. Farook et al. (2011) indicated that reputation is 
instrumental in measuring the disclosure level among IBs. The reputation of an SSB is measured 
based on SSB membership on AAOIFI committees which is similar methodology of Farook et al. 
(2011). Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H13: There is a positive relationship between SSB reputation and disclosure levels  
   3.4 Culture (AU)  
   When scholars compare the disclosure practice of firms from diverse countries, they should 
consider country systems. A spacious amount of literature (e.g., Hope, 2003) has been conducted 
on determinants that might explain differences in accounting practices. Among the many factors 
studied, cultural values is claimed to be most essential. The national culture is an institutional factor 
that influences both managers’ choices and investors’ preferences regarding financial reporting 
(Hope, 2003). Hofstede (2001) proposed six culture dimensions which are widely used in 
accounting research1 (e.g., Doupnik and Tsakumis, 2004). Jaggi and Low (2000) argued that the 
cultural factors of a country have an indirect impact on financial disclosures. Wong (2012) 
suggested that uncertainty avoidance (UA) is the most influential cultural dimension that may 
affect disclosure. Therefore, in this research; we just added UA in our model to see for what extent 
it has impacts on the disclosure level. This consists with prior research that used only this 
dimension (e.g., Khlif and Hussainey, 2014). Gray (1988) argued that: The higher a country ranks 
in terms of uncertainty avoidance are more likely it is to rank highly in terms of secrecy or rank 
lower in terms of disclosure. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H14: There is a negative association between uncertainty avoidance and disclosure  
4. Research methodology 
4.1 Sample selection 
   We choose all fully flagged IBs that adopted AAOIFI. Based on AAOIFI (2015), there are 141 
associated members, but not all of these banks adopt AAOIFI. We choose banks that adopted 
AAOIFI in MENA countries (i.e. Bahrain, Yemen, Qatar, Syria, Palestine, Sudan, Oman, and 
Jordan). The analysis was limited to 2013 because we did not find significant differences between 
last 3 years (2011-2013).  
4.2 Construction of disclosure indices for assessing the validity and reliability 
We construct Sharia, Social and Financial indices based on AAOIFI standards as follows. First, we 
adopt the disclosure requirements of AAOIFI Governance Standard No.1, Accounting Standard 
                                               
1 Hofstede six dimensions are power distance (PD), uncertainty avoidance (UA), individualism (IND), masculinity 
(MAS), long-term orientation (LTO) and Indulgence (INDU).  
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No.1, and Governance Standard No.7. We review the last available editions for AAOIFI (2010 
and 2014). Second, we reviewed the literature that explores CSR, SSB and FS (e.g., Aribi and Gao, 
2012; Maali et al., 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Hassan and Harahap, 2010; Belal et al., 2014; 
Ahmed and Khatun, 2013). This enables us to construct an initial index which includes 218 items 
required by AAOIFI standards. Then, to ensure the content validity of the index, it is reviewed 
independently by three other researchers. After receiving their comments and suggestions, any 
remaining ambiguities were discussed with a fourth experienced academic. The final index included 
214 items as shown in Table 1. To ensure the reliability of the research instrument, the principal 
author and two independent researchers scored five randomly selected banks. Then, the findings 
of the three researchers were compared. Given that the final research instrument had been agreed 
by all investigators, differences in the compliance scores across the investigators were not 
significant. Based on this, one overall index and three sub-indices (Sharia, social and financial) were 
constructed. The scores for the overall index and sub-indices were calculated by assigning equal 
weightings to each item of disclosure, and the indices were derived by computing the ratio of actual 
scores awarded to the maximum possible score attainable for items that were applicable to each 
Islamic bank.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
4.3 Model specification and variable measurement 
We use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) where the dependent variable is compliance/disclosure 
score and the independent variables include the factors discussed above. Therefore, we use the 
following OLS transformed multiple regression model:  
Disc i= β0+ β1 AUD+ β2 AGE+ β3 SIZE+ β4 PROF+ β5 SAD+ β6 BLOCK + β7 
INST + β8 FORGN + β9 DUAL+ β10 B.INDEP+ β11 SSBSIZ+ β12 SSBREPU+ 
β13 SSBCROSS+ β14 UNCER+ ɛ 
   Where Disc is the compliance indices, which measures the level of compliance of SSBR, CSRR, 
SF and aggregate disclosure for Islamic bank i; β0 is the intercept; β1…..β14 are regression 
coefficients; ɛ is error term. Variables definitions are shown in Table 2.  The disclosure score for 
each index is calculated as a ratio of the total items disclosed to 15 (maximum score for Sharia) for 
model 1; 104 (maximum score for financial) for model 2; 95 (maximum score for social) for model 
3 and 214 (maximum score for aggregate disclosure) for model 4. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
5. Results of Disclosure and Compliance Levels  
5.1 Level of compliance by banks and countries  
    Table 3 shows the compliance levels for each bank over 2013. It shows that Bahrain Islamic 
bank; Qatar first investment bank and Cham bank are the highest bank that complies with sharia 
disclosure. Jordan Islamic bank is the highest one that discloses information about CSR whereas a 
Qatar Islamic bank is highest bank related to financial disclosure.   
In terms of the comparison between disclosures types in each country, table 4 shows the disclosure 
levels for each country by number of banks and percentage based on average disclosure. The table 
indicates that Jordan disclosed 65%, which is more than Bahrain (56%). This is perhaps surprising, 
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since compliance with AAOIFI is mandatory for IBs in Bahrain. Sudan is the lowest country for 
compliance with AAOIFI (46%). Bahrain has the highest number of banks that have adopted 
AAOIFI (15 IBs) not only because Bahrain is the host nation for the AAOIFI, but, it is a 
requirement of the Central Bank of Bahrain that all IFIs licensed must comply with AAOIFI 
(Vinnicombe, 2010).  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
[Insert Table 4 here]  
5.2 Compliance levels with AAOIFI standards  
   Table 5 shows the compliance levels with AAOIFI Governance Standards No.1 5. It shows that 
the average compliance level for our selected banks is 68%. The disclosure level concerning with 
SSB members is 70% whereas the disclosure level concerned with SSB reports is 66%. Information 
about names of SSB has got the highest items (95%) whereas 22% only from our sample report 
that they are comply with AAOIFI.     
[Insert Table 5 here] 
   Table 6 shows the compliance level with AAOIFI Governance Standard No.7. It shows that the 
average compliance level for our selected banks is 27% which is beyond our expectations. The 
disclosure level related to universal-oriented CSR items is 30% while the disclosure level related to 
Islamic-oriented CSR items is 23%. It also shows that screening and informing clients for 
compliance with Islamic principles has the highest score (42%) and disclosure about Waqf 
management has the lowest score (2%).  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
   Table 7 shows the compliance level with AAOIFI Financial Standard No.1. It shows that the 
average compliance level is 73%. The disclosure level for universal-oriented financial disclosure is 
86%. However, the disclosure level related to Sharia-oriented financial disclosure is 36%. The table 
shows that the average disclosure level that is recommended by AAOIFI as well as IFRS and 
GAAP for universal financial statements (Financial Position Statement, Income Statement, Cash 
Flow Statement, Statement of Changes in the Owner's Equity) is 88% but the disclosure level 
related to Sharia-oriented financial statements (Statement of Changes in Restricted Investments, 
Statement of Zakat, and Statement of Qard Hasan) is 33%.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 Table 8 summarises the information provided by the annual reports for our 43 selected banks and 
discloses information about the main Islamic services such as Murabaha and Musharakah. It shows 
that Murabaha is the most popular service provided by IBs in the MENA region (91%) then, 
Mudaraba 79% and Ijara 70%. Salam is the lowest service presented (12%).  
 [Insert Table 8 here] 
   Table 9 shows the overall compliance levels for the 4 models based on disclosure related to 
universal and Sharia orientation. It shows that the levels of compliance related to Sharia 
accountability for SSBM and SSBR are mainly similar (70% and 66%). The compliance for 
universal CSR is 30% and for Sharia CSR items is 23%. Also, the compliance related to financial 
information common to international standards like IFRS is 86% whereas financial disclosure 
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related to Sharia items is 36%. Finally, compliance levels for items related to universal orientation 
are higher than information related to Sharia requirements. This result shows low compliance and 
disclosure level for social reporting of IBs. This result is matching with Maali et al. (2006); Hassan 
and Harahap (2010) and Farook et al. (2011) that recommend the extent of CSRD by IBs falls far 
short of their expectation (13.3%; 38% and 16.8% respectively). Maali et al (2006) indicate that 
IBs are not completely fulfilling their social role in accordance with the prescriptions of Islam. 
Based on our result; we conclude that IBs are mainly shaped and focused on economic incentives 
more than social norms which consistent with Aggarwal and Yousef, (2000). Kuran (2006) 
maintains that IBs appear to seek profit as aggressively as conventional banks. He argues that it is 
even unrealistic to suppose IBs’ activities as well CSRD to differ or be more socially accountable 
than conventional as they run in the equal global capitalistic situations. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
6. Empirical results 
6.1 Descriptive analysis 
    Table 10 reports the descriptive statistics. It shows that the average compliance level based on 
the AAOIFI standard for SSBR requirements is 68%, the compliance level for CSR is 27%, and 
the compliance level for financial accountability is 73%. Finally, the overall compliance for our 
selected banks is 56%. 65% of the selected banks are audited by the Big 4 firms namely: Ernst and 
Young, KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, and 67% of the banks have 
a Sharia Auditing Department (SAD). The average overall age of IBs is 19 years. The average board 
size is 4 members. 71% of SSB members have cross-membership with SSBs in other Islamic Banks 
(for example, Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Ghuddah is a member of the Sharia Supervisory Boards of 
more than 10 Islamic Banks). 50% of our SSB members are also members of AAOIFI committees 
and 57% of our SSB are members in more than one Islamic bank (Cross membership). The average 
number of blockholders is 3, mean institutional ownership is 58% and the average foreign 
ownership is 63%. The mean percentage of independent directors on the board is 49%. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
6.2 Regression results 
   Regression results are shown in Table 11. It shows the cross-sectional OLS regressions for the 
aggregated score of disclosures and three subcategories (SSB, CSR and FS). For the SSB score 
(model 1), we find that the coefficient estimates variables related to corporate governance of SSB 
are positive and significant at the 5% level. This result supports hypotheses H11, H12 and H13 
that IBs which have SSBs with more than 4 members, as well as SSB members who have cross-
membership with SSBs in other Islamic Banks and IBs with SSB members who are also members 
of AAOIFI committees disclose more Sharia information in their annual reports and websites. 
Furthermore, the coefficient estimates on Sharia auditing departments (SADs) is positive and 
significant. This supports hypothesis H5. Concerning model 2, the table shows that CSR is positive 
and significant with SIZE of bank at the 5% level. This result supports hypothesis H3. 
Furthermore, the coefficient estimate on AGE is positive and significant indicating that older IBs 
disclose more information about social activities, which supports hypothesis H2. For model 3, we 
find that the coefficient estimates on SIZE and SAD are positive and significant. Therefore, we 
partially accept hypotheses H3 and H5. Regarding aggregate compliance (model 4), we find 
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significant positive association between overall compliance and SIZE, AGE and SSB SIZE at the 
10% level. Therefore, hypotheses H2, H3 and H11 are partially accepted. For culture, we find that 
UA has a negative association with Sharia as well as aggregate disclosure level at the 10% level 
(models 1 and 4).  This result is consistent with Elshandidy et al., (2013) who found a negative 
association between UA and disclosure. These results therefore support the acceptance of H14. 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
7. Discussion 
   The insignificant associations between corporate disclosure and auditors are consistent with 
prior research (Barako et al., 2006; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Hossain et al., 1995). Our analysis 
identifies a significant association between disclosure level and existing SAD. This finding is 
consistent with previous literature which presents SAD as one of the main determinants of 
compliance with AAOIFI and shows that the internal audit function can enhance the disclosure 
quality (Bailey et al., 2003; Gramling et al., 2004; Carcello et al., 2005). Bank age is positively 
correlated with compliance. Empirically, we confirm the findings of Cormier et al. (2005) and 
Hossain and Hammami (2009) who reported a positive relationship between company age and 
corporate disclosure. The significant associations between corporate disclosure and bank size are 
consistent with prior empirical studies which identified company size as a determinant of 
disclosure level (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Street and Gray, 2001). We found that profitability is 
not associated with disclosure level. This result supports the argument that providing full 
disclosure in any situation is important whether it is achieving a profit or not (Haniffa, 2002). Also, 
this result is consistent with the findings of other researchers who did not find association between 
profitability and disclosure (Aras et al., 2010). 
The results do not support that CG attributes concerned with BOD have a significant effect on 
corporate disclosure. Based on our analysis, we found an insignificant link between duality in 
position and corporate disclosure. This result is supported by Ho and Wong (2001), Arcay and 
Vazquez (2005) and Cheng and Courtenay (2006). Related to institutional ownership, our outcome 
is consistent with Eng and Mak (2003) who found an insignificant relationship between the two 
variables. Our paper concludes an insignificant association between compliance levels and board 
independence which is consistent with Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Ho and Wong (2001) who 
did not find a relationship between the two variables. We find that the coefficient estimates on 
block holders and foreign ownership have an insignificant association with corporate disclosure. 
The insignificant sign on the number of block holders is consistent with the research of Samaha 
and Dahawy (2011) who did not find association between the variables. The insignificant link 
between foreign ownership and disclosure is consistent with Mangena and Tauringana (2007). 
The significant associations between disclosure and CG variables concerned with SSB are 
consistent with prior empirical disclosure reporting research (e.g., Singh et al., 2004; Abdul Rahman 
and Bukair, 2013; Hussain and Mallin, 2003, Farook et al., 2011; Haat et al., 2008; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Abdul Rahman and Bukair, 2013). Gray (1988) and Salter and Niswander (1995) 
showed that measures of national culture can help explain cross-country differences in accounting 
practices particularly with regard to disclosure level. The analysis shows that culture based on UA 
has a negative association with disclosure level (Sharia and aggregate). This result is supported by 
Hope (2003) who showed that cultural values are a determinant of differences between disclosure 
levels. Consequently, the purpose to achieve international convergence for IFIs, a main goal of 
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AAOIFI, should be expanded from merely adopting a single set of high-quality accounting 
standards to considering the cultural values of Islamic countries as well other countries that have 
Islamic banks or even Islamic windows around the world. 
8. Conclusion   
    We measured to what extent IBs that adopt AAOIFI standards are consistent with AAOIFI 
requirements. We also associated variations in SSBR, CSRR and financial statements disclosure 
levels with variations in both firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms related to 
BOD and SSB. The findings of this study illustrate a relatively low average level of compliance 
with AAOIFI disclosures related to social requirements (27%). It also indicates a relatively high 
average level of compliance with AAOIFI disclosures related to Sharia and financial requirements. 
This approximates to 68% for SSBR and 73% for financial disclosure level. We find that the 
corporate governance mechanisms related to SSB have significantly high explanatory power over 
Sharia disclosure variations compared with corporate governance mechanisms related to BOD. 
This can be explained based on the fact that AAOIFI standards for our selected banks are 
mandatory, and BOD does not have a direct role in ensuring compliance with standards, whereas 
SSB has a significant role in preparing reports about the compliance level with Sharia. We find also 
that firm characteristics (age, size and SAD) have a significant impact on disclosure variations.  
    These results have theoretical and practical implications. They suggest that more attention 
should be paid to variables that may explain the variations in Sharia, social and financial disclosure 
particularly those concerned with SSB. Our suggestion is consistent with a recent trend in the 
accounting literature (e.g., Farook et al., 2011; Abdul Rahman and Bukair, 2013) for research to 
look more deeply at the SSB characteristics of corporate governance. The practical implication of 
our results lies in our empirical evidence relevant to the importance and benefits of compliance 
with AAOIFI standards which has a significant impact on the image of IBs as well as approving 
Sharia compliance and serving society, which represent the main competitive advantages for these 
banks. Our results suggest that more attention should be paid to adoption of AAOIFI particularly 
for IBs who are members without adopting. Looking more closely at the variations in compliance 
with AAOIFI and the disclosure levels between the IBs in each country is useful for clearly 
identifying the extent to which the regulatory approach relies on either regulations or mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, AAOIFI should take measures to make their standards 
mandatory for all their members as a first step to making it compulsory for all IFIs. When we 
measured the disclosure levels for each country, we found that Bahrain is located in the fourth 
place after Jordan, Syria and Palestine. Consequently, we recommend that the Central Bank of 
Bahrain further investigate this issue and explore the reasons and the scope for enhancing 
compliance with AAOIFI. 
    Our results related to compliance levels of banks with AAOIFI adds significantly to Islamic 
accounting literature by emphasising the importance of widening this research scope to pay more 
attention to variations above the mandated requirements (AAOIFI adoption), which provide a 
minimum amount of information to all stakeholders. The results indicate that organising reporting 
by IBs that formally implement an accounting standard (AAOIFI) significantly improves the 
disclosure level for Sharia compliance by encouraging them to care about their SSB report. The 
results support the current trend in the regulations in Bahrain, Sudan and Jordan, which encourage 
the mandatory adoption of AAOIFI by IBs. The un-weighted disclosure index is adapted to 
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measure the compliance level with AAOIFI. However, this kind of disclosure index has an 
important limitation as the number of disclosure items required by different standards varies 
considerably. As in our research, some standards require a large number of items (104 items) to be 
disclosed (Accounting Standard No.1) whereas others require only a few items (15 items) to be 
disclosed (Governance Standard No.1). This may become a significant problem when studies 
examine compliance with AAOIFI disclosures. An alternative method recommended for future 
research to avoid this problem is the “partial compliance un-weighted approach” which was 
employed by Street and Gray (2001)). Furthermore, our paper only focused on 3 AAOIFI 
standards and further research may examine other standards.   
Further research could consider other variables that might affect compliance levels such as GDP, 
corruption index, and audit committee, leverage, ownership structure and other culture dimensions. 
In this study, the sample is restricted to Islamic banks in 8 countries that adopted AAOIFI 
standards during 2013. Further studies could extend the sample to other countries that have IBs 
and extend the covered period. Future research could also investigate the level and determinants 
pf compliance levels with AAOIFI standards for other financial institutions. Finally, additional 
research could be undertaken to examine the economic consequences of the compliance with 
AAOIFI standards.  
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Table (1): Ensuring validity of research instrument 
 
The weight is calculated based on final items for each standard dividend into total items (214). For example: weight 
of FSIFI.1 = 104/214*100= 49% 
Table (2): Summary of variable names, description and sources 
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Table (5): Compliance level with AAOIFI governance standards No.1 & 5 (SSB) 
 
Table (6): Compliance level with AAOIFI governance standard No.7 (CSR) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table (7): Compliance level with AAOIFI financial standard No.1 (Financial) 
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